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National Intelligence Daily

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
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	SYRIA-LEBANO	N: Reaction to US Airstrik	es		
		aid yesterday it will continuo verflying Syrian positions i		connais-	25 X 1
	Ambassador tha increased US-Isr Damascus believ	, Syrian Foreign Minister K t his government is concer aeli cooperation in the regi es that the US and Israel ha pressure against Syria.	ned over reports o ion. Khaddam imp	of olied	25 X 1
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	controlled territo the overflights. H	fered to guarantee that no ry would fire on MNF units le also said he would perso ns to agree to a firm coasc	if the US agreed onally urge Lebane	to stop	25 X 1
	opposition factio	ns to agree to a firm cease	e-iire.		23%
	some moderate Syrian military pe cooperation in Le the attacks as ar	US Embassy reports that published have condemned ositions as the first indication because the fighting mescalation of the fighting	the US airstrikes a on of closer US-Is iter Wazzan chara	against sraeli cterized	25.74
	stopped short of	outright condemnation.			25 X 1
	head of the Cent Department, yes far. TASS sugge expressed Sovie states. Zamyatin	ASS statement and remark ral Committee's Internation terday gave Moscow's mosted US-Israeli coordination to "solidarity" with Lebanor, at a Moscow press conferoral and material support	nal Information st authoritative rea n in the strikes an n, Syria, and other rence, said the US	action so id Arab SSR	
		states would repel US and			25 X 1
		een no significant Soviet m	ilitary reaction to t	the US	
	airstrikes.				25X1
					25 X 1
,	chances for milit acting in concert Damascus's offe controlled territo no role in Druze,	Although the Syrians apparary confrontation with the ary confrontation with the with Israel to limit Syrian in the prevent fire on MNF upry' is disingenuous in its in Shia, and Palestinian attache. This is clearly not the care.	US, they see the Linfluence in Lebannits from "Syrian-mplication that Sycks on the MNF fro	JS as non. ria has	25X1
	The Soviets other Arab state Damascus. Neve	are trying to maintain their s by showing diplomatic ar ertheless, Moscow continue ary response or to any sign	credibility with Synd moral support fes to avoid commit	for tting	
		tervention in a US-Syrian c		, 5011	25X1 25X1
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USSR: Press Conference on INF Deployments		
High-ranking officials at a press conference in Moscow reaffirmed General Secretary Andropov's statement of 24 N that INF talks could not be conducted unless NATO shows readiness to return to the situation existing before its INF deployments.	Vovember	25 X 1
First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko asserted tha readiness must take the shape of "deeds" and not just wo stopped short of demanding withdrawal of US missiles as precondition. Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov said that counterdeployments would be comparable to NATO's and "kept within those limits that are dictated by the actions of countries."	ords, but he a Soviet I would be	25X1
Ogarkov emphasized that the Soviet weapons deployed "oceans and seas" against US territory will be as effective weapons deployed in Europe, especially in terms of "flight their targets." He later asserted that the accuracy of cruise and their ability, when flying low, to avoid detection make strike" weapons comparable to ballistic missiles. He stated "operational-tactical missiles of greater range" to be depletest Germany and Czechoslovakia would reach most of N INF missile bases.	e as the US time to e missiles them "first d that the oyed in	25X1
Comment: Korniyenko's statement might imply that a in or a freeze on NATO's deployments at some future date sufficient for the talks to resume. Ogarkov's rationale for cruise missiles as "first strike" weapons probably will serve basis for a Soviet assertion that cruise missiles in submaric coasts pose a threat to the US analogous to that posed the NATO's INF missiles.	e would be considering re as the ines off US	25 X 1
Ogarkov's remarks about the range of missiles in East and Czechoslovakia are consistent with the deployment of kilometer-range SS-12/22, which can reach targets as far a US cruise missile bases in the UK. His remarks about counterdeployments being kept within the limits dictated to deployments suggest that the size and pace of the Soviet response will correspond closely to NATO's deployments.	f the 925- away as the by NATO's	25Y 1
response will correspond closely to NATO's deployments.		25X1

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NATO: Defense Ministers Meet		
The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independen	nce and Allied	
concerns over armaments cooperation and "out-of	-area''	
responsibilities are likely to dominate Allied discus		25 X 1
Defense Ministers meet today and tomorrow in Bru	ssers.	23/1
The US Embassy in Athens says Prime Ministe	er Panandreou	
intends to raise the Turkish Cypriot declaration and		
exercises in the Aegean. He will not propose formation		
Cyprus issue for the communique but will restate t including the Greek island of Lemnos in NATO exe		25 X 1
moduling the drook island of Lemmos in 1471 o exc	0101303.	25/(1
With NATO INF deployments under way, the D		
plan to devote particular attention to achieving comprovement goals endorsed by NATO last year. A		
Mission to NATO, several of the Allies, particularly		
may seek US assurances that armaments program		
weapons technologies will involve West European	industry.	25 X 1
Comment: Continuing Greek-Turkish disputes	may resurface	
over language contained in a study on the impact		
operations in Southwest Asia. In addition, several including the Dutch, Germans, Norwegians, and Ita	•	
reassessment of US plans for its rapid deployment		
argue that resource constraints will prevent them t	-	057/4
compensating for diversion of US forces from NAT	10.	25 X 1
Papandreou's statements on the Greek-Turkis	sh dispute at	
previous NATO meetings were not well received, a		
increasingly testy about the continuing intrusions of	oi this bilateral	

problem into NATO consultations. Papandreou may believe that the Ministers should condemn the Turkish Cypriot action, but a request for a collective judgment is likely to fail.

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UK-US: Foreign Policy Differences Highlighted

policy positions that are distinct from those of the US. The British have expressed concern that the recent US-Israeli accord will not improve prospects for reconciliation in Lebanon but could increase the risks for their contingent on the Multinational Force. The US Embassy in London warns that a US-Israeli "alliance" would be likely to cause the UK to disassociate itself from US policy in the Middle East and to renew its interest in an EC peace initiative. Moreover, according to British officials, Thatcher has rejected advice not to reply to a letter from General Secretary Andropov criticizing INF deployments because she favors "enhanced dialogue" with the East. Comment: Thatcher's actions do not represent a shift in foreign policy priorities, and the Prime Minister remains a steadfast supporter of the "special relationship" between the US and the UK. Nevertheless, the exigencies of British politics and the differences with the US over Middle East matters apparently have persuaded her that a more distinctly British approach to some issues will be helpful politically. The British are particularly concerned that close association with the US will put their interests in the Middle East at greater risk, especially if the Arabs believe the US and Israel are now open allies against Syria. In addition, differences over Grenada, the pending US recertification of Argentina for arms sales, and warnings from some MPs that British lives are at risk in Belize and Lebanon for US and not

Prime Minister Thatcher is emphasizing that the UK has foreign

The Prime Minister's trip to Hungary early next year, the prospect of additional trips to Warsaw Pact countries, and the decision to respond to Andropov without polemics all are being used to show that London's dealings with the East are not frozen. She wants to underscore the point, during a time when US-Soviet relations are troubled.

British interests have encouraged Thatcher to play up her own foreign policy role. She probably sees this as a way of deflecting criticism that she has placed too much emphasis on her relationship with the

current US Government.

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
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POLAND: Walesa More Conciliatory Lech Walesa's call yesterday for an end to some Western sanctions against Poland coincided with new regime press attacks on both him and the sanctions. He told Western journalists that he expects a renewal of antiregime demonstrations but opposes them. Comment: Walesa may be trying to appear more conciliatory in order to counter regime criticism and to encourage the government to negotiate with him. He is likely to develop his new position in a	25X1
promised speech on 16 December commemorating slain shipyard workers and outline a plan for future action, but the regime probably will not respond favorably. Although Solidarity militants will be disappointed over Walesa's call, some people will welcome his appeal for Western aid because they are concerned about expected price increases and the future of the economy. Walesa's change of heart may reflect the influence of church officials, many of whom have privately called for an easing of sanctions.	25X1
Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers, who began their semiannual meeting in Sofia yesterday, probably will concentrate on issues related to Western INF deployments and Eastern countermeasures. Moscow presumably has been disappointed by East European responses to its previous efforts to enlist support for its position on the INF issue. Defense Minister Ustinov and Marshal Kulikov arrived in Sofia early—over the weekend—and they plan separate talks with the Bulgarians after the Warsaw Pact meeting.	25X1
Comment: The early arrival of the Soviet representatives probably indicates an effort to secure better East European cooperation on INF at the meeting in Sofia. The most divisive issue probably will be the Soviet demand that the East Europeans increase their defense expenditures to cover the cost of military countermeasures to NATO's INF deployments. East German and Czechoslovak officials already are expressing concern about the costs associated with the stationing of 925-kilometer-range SS-22s in their countries.	25X1

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